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PARLIAMENTS STRENGTHEN JUDICIAL AS WELL 
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Summary: It is argued that subsidiarity should be interpreted, in ac-
cordance with the principle of effectiveness, as requiring that the Com-
munity should only act where the objectives of the proposed action 
can only be achieved at Community level. Subsidiarity has not so far 
been an effective brake on action by the European institutions, and 
the Court’s scrutiny of Community acts for compliance with subsidiar-
ity has been undemanding. The Constitution Treaty seeks to confi rm 
and strengthen application of subsidiarity. Monitoring by national 
parliaments, and in particular the possibility for one third to object 
to a proposal on subsidiarity grounds, thus “showing a yellow card,” 
could lead to improved compliance with subsidiarity by the lawmak-
ing institutions; and the “yellow card” procedure could change the 
dynamics of judicial enforcement of subsidiarity. Where national par-
liaments “raised a yellow card,” but the Commission maintained its 
draft, one possibility (which the present writer would advocate) would 
be that in any subsequent judicial proceedings the Court of Justice 
would require the Commission to demonstrate that the national par-
liaments had made a manifest error of appraisal in objecting to the 
draft act on subsidiarity grounds. Giving teeth to subsidiarity by en-
trusting national parliaments with responsibility for monitoring its 
application, and reinforcing that responsibility with an appropriate 
judicial response from the Court of Justice, could enhance the sense 
of “ownership” of the European project at national level. Although it 
appears unlikely that the Constitution Treaty will come into force, that 
fact need not prevent the introduction by other means of subsidiarity 
monitoring by national parliaments, and the adoption by the Court of 
Justice of the approach indicated.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to recall and develop the critical analysis of 
subsidiarity which the present writer has advanced in recent years.1 The 
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new argument to be advanced here is that a system of political monitor-
ing of subsidiarity by national parliaments would provide the justifi cation 
for a new approach to the judicial control of subsidiarity. The present 
writer will indicate what such a new approach might be, and argue that, 
if monitoring by national parliaments is introduced, such an approach 
should be adopted by the Court of Justice.
Origins of Subsidiarity2
The principle of subsidiarity, though not under that name, was fi rst 
introduced as a principle of the Community legal order by the Single 
European Act, which introduced an Environmental Title into the (then) 
EEC Treaty, and provided that the Community should take action to the 
extent to which environmental objectives “can be attained better at Com-
munity level than at the level of the individual Member States.”3 
Subsidiarity in its present form was introduced by the Maastricht 
amendments to the EEC Treaty.4 Subsidiarity was a response to the wide 
and expanding scope of Community lawmaking competence and to the 
increasing exercise of that competence. The wide and expanding scope of 
Community lawmaking competence resulted from several factors: (a) the 
original EEC Treaty gave fairly wide lawmaking competence to the Coun-
cil; (b) lawmaking competences under that Treaty were interpreted widely 
by the European institutions, including the Court of Justice, and by the 
Member States in their capacity as members of the Council; (c) addi-
tions to lawmaking competences had been made,5 and were being made.6 
While these latter factors contributed to the growth of Community com-
petence, the adoption in practice of qualifi ed majority voting subsequent 
to the amendments introduced by the SEA contributed to an increase in 
the exercise of that competence post 1987. On one measure, the annual 
number of binding acts adopted by the Community institutions more 
2 There is an extensive literature on the principle of subsidiarity, much of it now overtaken 
by events. For a selection of views, see V Constantinesco, ‘Who’s afraid of Subsidiarity?’ 
(1991) 11 YEL 33; N Emiliou, ‘Subsidiarity — An Effective Barrier against the Enterprises of 
Ambition?’ (1992) 17 ELRev 383; AG Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht 
Treaty’ (1992) 29 CMLRev 1079; D Cass, ‘The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29 CML-
Rev 1107; E Mattina, ‘Subsidiarite, Democratie et Transparence’ (1992) 4 RMUE 203; JP 
Gonzalez, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’ (1995) 20 ELRev 355; D Wyatt, ‘Subsidiarity - Is it 
too Vague to be Effective as a Legal Principle?’ in K Nicolaidis and S Weatherill (eds), Whose 
Europe? National Models and the Constitution of the European Union (OUP/European Stud-
ies, Oxford 1993) <http://www.europeanstudies.ox.ac.uk> accessed 9 August 2006
3 EEC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) art 130R (4)
4 EC Treaty (Treaty of Rome, as amended) art 3b
5 The Single European Act 1986
6 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
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than doubled between 1986 and 1992, from 311 to 752.7 In the run up 
to the agreement on the Maastricht amendments, some Member States, 
including Spain, France and Italy, had sought a reference to subsidiarity 
in the preamble of the EC Treaty.8 The main advocates of subsdiarity as 
a legally binding principle inhibiting the exercise of Community compe-
tence had been Germany and the United Kingdom.9 
How effective has subsidiarity been in practice?
Views differ as to the effectiveness of subsidiarity as a brake on Com-
munity action in the hands of the political institutions and the Court of 
Justice. The Constitution Treaty in a Protocol on Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality seeks to confi rm and strengthen application of susidiarity, 
and provides for monitoring of the application of the principle by national 
parliaments and by the Court of Justice. The European Unioin Commit-
tee of the Upper House of the United Kingdom Parliament (the House of 
Lords) has examined the proposed monitoring procedures in some detail. 
The European Union Committee of the House of Lords undertook in the 
Session 2004-2005 an assessment of subsidiarity monitoring in order 
“to focus Parliamentary and public attention on subsidiarity monitoring” 
and to advise the House of Lords on how, if the Constitution Treaty comes 
into force, the House might fulfi l its new obligations.10 A written question 
posed by the Committee to the British Government gives some indication 
of the balance of the evidence received by the Committee: “Looking at the 
written evidence we have received it seems that most people believe that 
thus far the principle of subsidiarity has not acted as an effective “brake” 
on the exercise of lawmaking powers at the Community level. Do you 
agree and if so why is this?” The reply by the Minister for Europe gave a 
fi rm endorsement of subsidiarity in practice:
“The Government believes that… the EU’s general direction has been 
positively infl uenced by the institutions’ increasing application of 
subsidiarity. In particular the Government believes that the princi-
7 Antonio Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (OUP, Oxford 2002) 20, 
Table I.3.
8 Javier Elorza, ‘Subsidiariedad’ in Breve diccionario del Tratado de la Unión Europea (Vol VI 
Política exterior, 29 Otoño 1992), 126. See also Estella (n 7) 85.
9 Estella (n7) 85. Also Cloos, Reinesch and others, Le Traité de Maastricht: Genèse, Anal-
yse, Commentaires (Bruylant, Bruxelles 1993) 149. And see Schilling, ‘A New Dimension of 
Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle’ (1994) 14 YEL 203, referring to Case, 
‘The Word that Saved Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers 
within the European Community’ (1992) 29 CMLR 1107.
10 Report with Evidence from the EU Committee, ‘Strengthening national parliamen-
tary scrutiny of the EU - the Constitution’s subsidiarity early warning mechanism’, HL 
(2004-2005)14 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldeu-
com/101/10102.htm> accessed 9 August 2006.
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ple of subsidiarity has worked as an effective tool in infl uencing the 
formulation of European legislation.”11
The Government’s position was consistent with evidence offered by 
certain British MEPs,12 who noted that every proposal emerging from 
Brussels already had to contain recitals indicating why and how the pro-
posal complied with the principle of subsidiarity. The Committee con-
trasted with the Government’s view that “the institutions are applying the 
principle in practice as part of the policy-making and legislative process,” 
an alternative view, to the effect “that subsidiarity has so far received only 
token attention from the EU institutions and has certainly not served as a 
founding principle to encourage self-restraint on the part of the Commu-
nity institutions in their law making activities.”13 The Committee cited in 
support of this proposition evidence submitted by Professors Weatherill 
and Wyatt of the University of Oxford. Professor Weatherill had argued to 
the Committee that “so far subsidiarity has done little to shake existing 
cultures of lawmaking at EU level.”14 The evidence of the present writer to 
the Committee is cited as follows:
“Professor Wyatt has offered three possible reasons to explain why 
subsidiarity might thus far have failed to live up to its promise:
• Subsidiarity is “a principle ill-designed to achieve the objective of 
ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citi-
zen”…
• There is political indifference towards the principle or “antipathy on 
the part of the Community institutions and some Member States”..
• There is “constitutional indifference or antipathy on the part of the 
Court of Justice”…15
The Committee noted this division of opinion about the effi cacy of 
subsidiarity in practice, and expressed the hope that the new Protocol 
to the Constitution Treaty would “provide a vehicle for highlighting and 
invigorating subsidiarity compliance across the Union.”16 In its summary 
of recommendations, the Committee expressed the hope “that the Court 
will take a more critical approach to subsidiarity, particularly in ensuring 
that the justifi cation for action at Union level is adequate.”17 The present 
writer would argue that there is certainly room for a more critical ap-
proach to subsidiarity on the part of the Court of Justice, and for a more 
11 Report (n10), Minutes of Evidence para 66.
12 MEPs Richard Corbett and Andrew Duff.
13 Report (n10) para 77.
14 Ibid.
15 Report (n10) [78].
16 Report (n10) [84].
17 Ibid para 244.
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rigorous approach to application of the principle to proposals for legisla-
tion on the part of the Commission, Council and Parliament.
Subsidiarity should be interpreted and applied in a way which is 
effective in practice
Subsidiarity aims to identify objectives which can only be 
achieved by Community wide action - the two fold test is in truth 
a single test
Subsidiarity is fi rst and foremost a political principle, to be inter-
preted and applied by the Community institutions. Yet it is equally a 
fundamental principle of the Community legal order, to be interpreted in 
light of its text, its aim, and the principle of effectiveness. 
Article 5 of the EC Treaty provides that, “in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” 
The text thus appears to lay down a “dual” test or requirement for 
Community action, (a) that the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, and (b) that those objec-
tives can by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. It will be argued that this test should be read 
as posing a single question: can the objectives of the proposed action only 
be achieved by Community wide action? If the answer to this question is 
“yes”, the proposed action is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity; 
if the answer is “no”, then the objectives can be suffi ciently achieved at 
national level and the principle of subsidiarity is not satisfi ed.
It is textually possible to interpret the dual test for subsidiarity in 
a way which minimises or eliminates its potential to inhibit Community 
action. Thus a proposal for Community wide rules on any subject mat-
ter at all within Community competence might be said to pass the dual 
test, on the grounds that Member States cannot individually achieve the 
objectives of the proposal (the adoption of Community wide rules), while 
the scale or effects of the proposed action (Community wide rules) can 
be better (indeed only) achieved at Community level. Commission refer-
ences to subsidiarity in explanatory memoranda to some measures seem 
to imply such an approach.18 Support for this approach might be derived 
18 See e.g., the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on certain 
Community measures to combat discrimination (1999/C 369/03) - paragraph on subsid-
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from terms in which the Court rejected the argument that the adoption of 
Council Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects of the organiza-
tion of working time contravened the principle of subsidiarity. The Court 
stated that once the Council had found that it was necessary to improve 
the existing level of protection as regards the health and safety of workers 
and to harmonize conditions in this area, achievement of that objective 
through the imposition of minimum requirements necessarily presup-
posed Community-wide action.19 
Yet such an approach is to say the least open to serious criticism. 
To interpret the principle of subsidiarity as laying down a test for the 
exercise of Community competence which all proposed Community leg-
islation is bound to pass would deprive the principle of useful effect. The 
rationale of the two-fold test is to determine whether the scale or effects 
of the proposed action would be such as to justify the adoption of Com-
munity wide rules, or whether the subject matter of the proposed action 
should be left to policy choices on the part of national or sub-national 
authorities of Member States. Community legislation by its very nature 
produces a Community-wide legal outcome. The core task of subsidiarity 
is to distinguish proposed Community measures whose objectives will (by 
defi nition) produce a Community wide outcome, from proposed measures 
which must produce a Community wide outcome if their objectives are 
to be achieved. The objectives of proposed Community action, referred 
to in the defi nition of subsidiarity, which cannot be suffi ciently achieved 
by the Member States, but which can be better achieved at Community 
level, are objectives which can only be achieved by Community wide ac-
tion. It might be said that the text of Article 5 implies that some objec-
tives can be both achieved by Member States and by the Community, 
but not suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, and better achieved 
by the Community. Indeed - and those objectives which can be said with 
confi dence to be better achievable by the Community than the Member 
States, even if to some extent achievable by the Member States, are those 
iarity: “The draft directives would lay down a set of principles on equal treatment cover-
ing key issues, including protection against harassment, the possibility for positive action, 
appropriate remedies and enforcement measures. These principles would be applied in all 
Member States, thus providing certainty for individuals about the common level of protec-
tion from discrimination they can expect. Common standards at Community level can only 
be achieved through co-ordinated action.” For criticism of the “circularity” of the subsid-
iarity reasoning in the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Directive 
to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common 
rules to legal aid and other fi nancial aspects of civil proceedings, COM (2002) 13 fi nal, and 
generally, see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the New Proposed Proto-
col’ (Portuguese translation) in AAVV, Uma Constituição para a Europa (Almedina Coimbra 
2004)
19 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the Euro-
pean Union [1996] ECR I-5755 paras 47 and 55.
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objectives which can only be achieved at Community level.  On this view, 
the two-fold test for compliance with subsidiarity is in truth a single test 
- can the objectives of the proposed action only be achieved by Commu-
nity wide action.
Subsidiarity guidelines support the view that the Community 
should only act where the objectives of the proposed action can 
only be achieved at Community level
This interpretation of the test for subsidiarity is supported by the 
guidelines which were adopted for its implementation by the Community 
institutions, fi rst in the “soft law” form adopted at the Edinburgh sum-
mit of 11-12 December 1992, and subsequently in the 1997 Amsterdam 
Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
Two of these guideline are in particularly worthy of remark. The fi rst 
is that the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which 
cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States. The sec-
ond is that actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action 
would confl ict with the requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to 
correct distortion of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade or 
strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would otherwise signifi cantly 
damage Member States’ interests. The references to transnational aspects, 
to distortion of competition, and disguised restrictions on trade, support 
an interpretation of subsidiarity which requires that Community action 
in areas of non exclusive competence be confi ned to the achievement of 
objectives which can be achieved only by Community wide action. 
Reference to the requirements of the Treaty as including economic 
and social cohesion, and the indication that Community action would 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity where its lack “would other-
wise signifi cantly damage Member States’ interests”, seem to support a 
broader approach to subsidiarity, and indeed to establish a subjective 
and open ended opportunity for any proposed measure to be treated as 
compliant with that principle. Yet such a literal construction would seem 
to be inappropriate. The words referred to should be construed in light of 
the aim of the Protocol, and the aim of the guidelines in which the words 
are to be found, which is to secure implementation of the subsidiarity 
principle. The words referred to should thus be interpreted as mean-
ing that any requirements of the Treaty as regards economic and social 
cohesion, and any signifi cant damage to Member States’ interests, be 
requirements and/or damage which could only remedied by Community 
wide action. The substantive content of subsidiarity might thus be sim-
ply summarised: in areas of non-exclusive competence, the Community 
should act if and only if the objectives of the proposed action can only be 
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achieved by Community wide action: in such circumstances the objec-
tives in question cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, 
and can be better achieved by the Community. 
More than one rational assessment of whether proposed action 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity may be possible
Objectives for proposed action may be “mixed”- some may satisfy 
the subsidiarity test, others may not
Application of this principle, as formulated above, on the other hand, 
is not necessarily straightforward, in that it is possible for rational indi-
viduals to come to different conclusions as regards the same proposed 
action. One reason for this is that the objectives of proposed action may 
be mixed; some objectives may not require Community wide action, other 
objectives may require such action. Take for example a proposed internal 
market measure which would harmonise certain national rules which 
have the aim of protection of public health. Suppose (a) that the prin-
cipal aim of the measure is public health, (b) that the measure makes 
a very modest contribution to the internal market, and that contribu-
tion is clearly a secondary aim, but the latter contribution is suffi cient 
for competence to be established pursuant to Article 95 EC.20 In such a 
case it would, in principle, be rational (in the sense of within the range 
of options open to a rational decision-maker taking into account all rel-
evant legal and factual considerations) for the Community institutions 
to reason (i) that the principal objectives of the proposed action (public 
health objectives) could not be better achieved at Community level, (ii) 
that these objectives could be suffi ciently achieved at national level,21 (iii) 
that the (secondary) internal market objectives of the measure could be 
better achieved at Community level (this will invariably be the case22), (iv) 
that the benefi ts of the Community wide action would be very modest, 
since any positive effects on trade and market conditions resulting would 
be slight, and (v) that their overall assessment was thus that the measure 
20 It follows from case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union [2000] ECR I-8419 (‘Tobacco Advertising case’), that where a 
directive adopted under Article 95 EC pursues trade and health aims, it is necessary only 
that the directive makes a genuine contribution to the internal market, and not that the 
primary objective of the measure is to make such a contribution - see paras 76, 84 and 88; 
also see case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American 
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-11453 paras 61 and 62.
21 It is to be noted that public health remains an area of primarily national competence, 
and that the Title on Public Health excludes Community harmonisation, see EC Treaty art 
152(4)(c). 
22 Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union [2000] ECR I-8419; Case C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Euro-
pean Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079.
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did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. A contrary conclusion 
in identical circumstances might (just) be equally rational. Different as-
sessment might be possible of the respective weights to be attached to the 
various objectives of the proposed act. Even a modest contribution to the 
internal market might be seen as signifi cant, and the internal market ob-
jectives of the measure might thus be seen as equal to or more signifi cant 
than the public health objectives, despite the fact that that public health 
objectives were in themselves and in principle matters for national com-
petence rather than Community competence, and only matters appropri-
ate for regulation under Article 95 EC by virtue of the overall contribution 
of any relevant measure to the internal market. 
Procedural requirements designed to facilitate analysis
It was to facilitate analysis of such issues in a transparent and sys-
tematic way that procedural requirements were introduced - fi rst in the 
Edinburgh Conclusions and in the 1993 Inter-Institutional agreement, 
and later in the Amsterdam Protocol - which would apply to subsidiarity 
appraisal during the legislative process. The procedural requirements laid 
down by the Amsterdam Protocol23 were (i) each institution must ensure 
that subsidiarity is complied with; (ii) for any proposed legislation, the 
reasons on which it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying its 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity; (iii) the reasons for conclud-
ing that a Community objective can be better achieved by the Community 
must be substantiated by qualitative or wherever possible, quantitative in-
dicators; (iv) compliance with subsidiarity should only established where 
action at Community level would produce clear benefi ts compared with 
action at the level of the Member States; (v) the Commission should justify 
the relevance of its proposals with regard to the principle of subidiarity, 
and wherever necessary, the explanatory memorandum accompanying a 
proposal shall give details in this respect; (vi) the European Parliament 
shall consider the consistency of Commission proposals with the principle 
of subsidiarity; (vii) in the course of the co-decision and co-operation pro-
cedures, the European Parliament shall be informed of the Council’s posi-
tion on the application of the principle of subsidiarity, by way of a state-
ment of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its common position. 
Reasons must be substantiated by qualitative or wherever 
possible, quantitative indicators
Two of the procedural requirements listed above are worthy of fur-
ther remark. The fi rst is the requirement that reasons for concluding that 
23 These requirements are similar to those set out in the Edinburgh Conclusions and the 
1993 Inter-Institutional agreement.
10 Derrick Wyatt: Could a “Yellow Card” for National Parliaments Strengthen the Judicial... 
a Community objective can be better achieved by the Community must 
be substantiated by qualitative or wherever possible, quantitative indica-
tors. Quantitative indicators (such as trade statistics and results of mar-
ket research) can be of particular assistance when assessing whether any 
possible transnational aspects of a proposed act can or cannot be satis-
factorily regulated at the national or sub national level, or when assess-
ing possible distortions of competition or disguised restrictions on trade 
which will allegedly be remedied by the proposed action. Furthermore, 
subject matter such as transnational effects, distortions of competition, 
and disguised restrictions on trade, are particularly susceptible to quan-
titative analysis, even though this seems rarely to have been undertaken 
in any detail during the legislative process. 
Action at the Community level must produce clear benefi ts 
compared with action at the level of the Member States
The second procedural requirement worthy of remark is that ac-
tion at the Community level would produce clear benefi ts compared with 
action at the level of the Member States. This requirement is described 
as procedural since the reference to clear benefi ts stipulated a standard 
akin to a standard of proof. If the question of benefi ts at the Community 
level was in doubt that doubt was to be resolved in favour of the exercise 
of national or sub national policy choices. This “standard of proof” may 
be derived from the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, which is that 
decisions be taken “as closely as possible to the citizen.”24 Since the Eu-
ropean level is (within the Community/Union legal order) as distant as 
it is possible to get from the citizen, this principle might well be said to 
create a mild presumption against action at the European level, and it 
is consistent with this presumption that it be demonstrated that Com-
munity action would produce clear benefi ts compared with action at the 
level of the Member States. This in turn supports the approach indicated 
above, to the effect that the principle of subsidiarity should be interpreted 
as requiring that the Community should only act where the objectives of 
the proposed action can only be achieved at Community level.
Enforcement of Subsidiarity by the Court of Justice
Substantive review subject to wide margin of appreciation and 
successful challenge on this ground close to impossible to envisage
The Amsterdam Protocol states that “compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity shall be reviewed in accordance with the rules laid down 
24 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art 1; Constitutional Protocol on the ap-
plication of the principles of Subsdiarity and Proportionality (Draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, Part IV).
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by the Treaty.”25 If legislation is adopted by the institutions contrary to 
the principle of subsidiarity this is a matter which in principle can be 
raised before the Court of Justice. It has always been diffi cult to imagine 
the Court annulling a Community act on the ground that the institutions 
had been wrong to conclude that the objectives of the proposed action 
could be better achieved by action at the Community level than at the 
level of the Member States, as a result of the wide discretion, or margin 
of appreciation, accorded to the institutions in the making of complex 
assessments.26 Nevertheless, even in the case of acts involving a complex 
assessment, the Court is entitled to examine the accuracy of the fi ndings 
of fact and law made by the authority concerned,27 and as noted above, 
in the context of subsidiarity, the Court has been prepared to address 
the question whether “the objective of the proposed action could be bet-
ter achieved at Community level”.28 Yet in a case where the objectives of 
the act in question related both the internal market and to public health, 
and the latter objective was almost certainly the dominant objective, the 
Court considered only whether the internal market objective of moving 
future emerging obstacles to trade could be better achieved at Commu-
nity level.29 This is in contrast to the assessment of proportionality of the 
act in question, which took account of public health objectives as well as 
internal market objectives.30 The Court’s differential treatment of subsidi-
arity and proportionality seems designed to minimize any possibility of 
substantive review and create an irrebutable presumption that the objec-
tives of internal market measures can be better achieved at Community 
level rather than national level.
25 See n 13.
26 D Wyatt,’ Subsidiarity and Judicial Review’, in O’Keeffe and Bavasso (eds), Liber Amicorum 
in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley Kluwer (Subsidiarity and Judicial Review 2000) 505.
27 Case C-120/97 Upjohn Ltd v. The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 
and Others [1999] ECR I-223 para 34, citing joined cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Con-
sten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Commu-
nity [1966] ECR 299, case 55/75 Balkan-Import Export v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof [1976] 
ECR 19 para 8, case 9/82 Lene Øhrgaard and Jean-Louis Delvaux v Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities [1983] ECR 2379 para 14, case C-225/91 Matra SA v Commission of the 
European Communities [1993] ECR I-3203 paras 24-25, and case C-157/96 The Queen v Min-
istry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ex parte National 
Farmers’ Union, David Burnett and Sons Ltd, R. S. and E. Wright Ltd, Anglo Beef Processors 
Ltd, United Kingdom Genetics, Wyjac Calves Ltd, International Traders Ferry Ltd, MFP Interna-
tional Ltd, Interstate Truck Rental Ltd and Vian Exports Ltd. [1998] ECR I-2211 para 39. 
28 Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American To-
bacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-11453 para 180.
29 Ibid paras 61 and 181.
30 Ibid paras 122-141. This cannot be explained by the way the case was argued since the 
applicants contended that there was no evidence for the proposition that the Member States 
were precluded from taking such steps to protect public health as they might wish to take, 
thus denying that the public health objectives of the act could be better achieved at the 
Community level.
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Judicial enforcement of essential procedural requirements less 
problematic
Annulment of a binding act for failure to comply with an essential 
procedural requirement relating to application of the principle of subsidi-
arity has always been a much more likely possibility than annulment for 
manifest error of assessment. It is unfortunately the case however that the 
Court’s approach to the requirement that the statement of reasons of an 
act indicate compliance with subsidiarity has been undemanding. If the 
reasoning of a Community act indicates in substance the grounds for the 
conclusion that objectives of the act in question could not be suffi ciently 
achieved by the Member States, this is regarded as suffi cient to satisfy the 
procedural requirements of Community law, and there is no requirement 
that specifi c reference be made to “subsidiarity”.31 The Court could and 
in the opinion of the present writer should, at the outset, have required 
more detail in the statement of reasons of an act relating to compliance 
with subsidiarity, in particular as regards relevant transnational aspects, 
as regards the existence or not of qualitative and quantitative indicators, 
and as regards reasons why (if this was the case) it had not been possible 
to substantiate compliance by reference to quantitative indicators. The 
texts of explanatory memoranda accompanying proposals for legislation 
invariably contain brief and self-serving references to subsidiarity, as do 
references to subsidiarity in the preambles of legislation; these practices 
can only have been encouraged by the Court’s undemanding approach 
to the requirement that the statement of reasons for binding cover sub-
sidiarity. Furthermore, it is established that the failure to take account of 
matters which it is essential to take into account will amount to a ground 
for annulment.32 Thus the failure to address transnational aspects etc., 
during the legislative process, would amount to infringement of an essen-
tial procedural requirement. In the case on the Working Time Directive, 
the United Kingdom argued that the institutions had neither fully consid-
ered nor demonstrated that there were transnational aspects etc., but the 
Court did not appear to consider the contention as relevant.33
31 Case C-233/94 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union [1997] ECR I-2405 paras 22-27. There is equally no need to make a specifi c 
reference to “proportionality”, see case C-150/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland v Council of the European Union [1998] ECR I-7325 para 37. 
32 Case 191/82 EEC Seed Crushers’ and Oil Processors’ Federation (FEDIOL) v Commission 
of the European Communities [1983] ECR 2913 para 30; scrutiny to determine whether in-
stitution has omitted to take into consideration any essential matters part of normal powers 
of review of the Court of Justice.
33 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the Euro-
pean Union [1996] ECR I-5755 para 46. A similar argument was made in case C-491/01 The 
Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and 
Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-11453, but the point was not referred to by the Court.
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The position under the Constitution Treaty
Duty of the institutions to ensure respect for subsidiarity 
- stronger duty to demonstrate compliance, but abbreviated 
guidelines
The Constitution Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality con-
fi rms the duty of the institutions (i) to ensure respect for the principle of 
subsidiarity, as laid down in Article 1-11 of the Constitution,34 and (ii) 
to justify acts as regards compliance with subsidiarity.35 The Protocol 
somewhat strengthens the obligation to provide justifi cation of draft leg-
islative acts with regard to subsidiarity. In the Amsterdam Protocol, the 
obligation was to give details in this respect “wherever necessary”; in the 
Constitution Protocol any draft European legislative act “should contain 
a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with… 
subsidiarity.” The Amsterdam guidelines (transnational aspects etc) are 
abbreviated to the short statement that “the reasons for concluding that 
a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substan-
tiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.” It 
is not considered that this would have the effect of reducing the grounds 
on which draft legislative acts could be scrutinized for conformity with 
subsidiarity by confi ning scrutiny to the abovementioned considerations. 
Subsidiarity is a fundamental principle with clearly expressed aims and 
a basis in primary law. The Community institutions would be bound to 
apply that principle in accordance with its text and its aims and taking 
account of all relevant factual and legal considerations, including, for 
example, whether the proposed action would have transnational effects, 
or would correct distortions of competition.
Monitoring by national parliaments - the “yellow card”
The preamble of the Constitution Protocol on Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality records that the High Contracting Parties are resolved to es-
tablish a system for monitoring the application of those principles. As 
noted above, this monitoring is to be carried out by national parliaments 
and by the European Court of Justice. National parliaments are under 
a duty to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity pursuant 
to Article I-11(3). Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act’s 
non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one 
third, or one quarter as the case may be,36 of all the votes allocated to 
the national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed, and the competent 
34 Protocol (n 24) art 1.
35 Protocol (n 24) art 5.
36 In the case of a draft legislative act submitted on the basis of art III-264 on the area of 
freedom, security and justice.
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institution may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. Reach-
ing these thresholds for review have been described as analogous to the 
raising of a yellow card by the referee in a football match. Reasons must 
be given for a decision to maintain, amend or withdraw a draft. These 
arrangements provide for monitoring of the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity by political institutions in the course of the lawmaking 
process. Yet the requirement for reasoned opinions on the part of the 
national parliaments, and for reasons to be given if the competent in-
stitution at the Union level decides to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
draft legislative act in question, would be likely at least to some extent 
to formalise and perhaps systematise, subsidiarity scrutiny at both the 
Union level, and the level of national parliaments. Even if the competent 
institution (for example the Commission) decided to maintain a draft to 
which objection had been made by the requisite number of national par-
liaments, it would be open to other institutions (for example the Council 
and European Parliament) to take into account and, if they considered it 
appropriate, act upon, the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments. 
The House of Lords EU Committee Report referred to above expressed 
the view that “the raising of a yellow card would have a signifi cant effect 
on the EU institutions…if national parliaments operate the mechanism 
effectively it would be hard for the Commission and the Council to resist 
such sustained political pressure.”37
Would and should a “yellow card” alter the dynamics of judicial 
enforcement of subsidiarity?
Light touch review or a new approach by the Community Courts
Article 8 of the Protocol provides that the Court of Justice shall have 
jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of sub-
sidiarity by a European legislative act. It might of course be the case that 
the light touch review applied by the Court of Justice in cases where in-
fringement of the principle of subsidiarity is alleged would be maintained 
even if the monitoring mechanisms of the Protocol come into force. Yet 
that is not certain. As the House of Lords EU Committee Report states: 
“The Protocol reaffi rms that application of the principle of subsidiarity 
must be properly substantiated in each case. National parliaments can 
be expected to look closely at this and can reasonably expect the Court 
to do likewise.”38 
It is certainly feasible that the competences and responsibilities al-
lotted to national parliaments and the lawmaking institutions under the 
37 Report (n 10) para 126.
38 Report (n 10) para 243.
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Protocol might be held to affect the course of any subsequent legal pro-
ceedings (were the Constitution Treaty to come into force or were such 
monitoring by national parliaments to be otherwise introduced) in which 
the compliance of a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity were 
raised. 
Absence of a yellow card might preclude review other than on 
grounds of lack of reasoning
In the fi rst place, a plea before the Court of Justice that the principle 
of subsidiarity had been infringed by a European legislative act,39 where 
national parliaments had not “raised a yellow card,” might be regarded by 
the Court of Justice as prima facie unfounded - even manifestly unfound-
ed, except perhaps as regards a plea that the legislative act as adopted 
should be annulled for want of reasoning, though even in such a case 
the implicit endorsement of national parliaments might be considered to 
deprive a procedural challenge of useful purpose.
Where the Commission resists a yellow card, the issue in 
subsequent legal proceedings ought to be whether the yellow card 
was manifestly unfounded
Where, by way of contrast, national parliaments had “raised a yel-
low card” to a Commission draft, but the Commission had maintained its 
draft, with reasons, and the draft had been subsequently adopted, one 
possibility (which the present writer would advocate) would be that the 
Court of Justice would regard it as a procedural requirement essential 
to the validity of the act in question that the reasons of the Commis-
sion demonstrate that the national parliaments had made a manifest 
error of appraisal in objecting to the draft act on subsidiarity grounds. 
That is to say, the focus of the legal challenge would be on the question 
whether the national parliaments had acted rationally, in the sense of 
having properly directed themselves in fact and law, and having taken 
into account all relevant considerations, in objecting to the proposed act 
on subsidiarity grounds. To review compliance of a legislative act with 
the principle of subsidiarity via scrutiny of the defensibility of the objec-
tions raised by national parliaments would be preferable to purporting 
to review in its entirety the conduct of the lawmaking institutions in the 
lawmaking process. It would certainly be more practical. Experience has 
shown that the Court of Justice has been unwilling to consider seriously 
arguments to the effect that Council and Parliament have failed to take 
account, or adequately to take account of the subsidiarity guidelines in 
39 That is to say, a draft European law or European framework law; see art I-33.
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the Amsterdam Protocol. But establishing the strict accuracy of such 
claims, and counterclaims by the institutions could never be easy, given 
the lack of transparency of the proceedings of the Council (though this 
may soon change)40, and relative complexity of proceedings in the Parlia-
ment. Review of the kind proposed above would ensure that appropriate 
weight would be accorded to the assessment of the national parliaments, 
in recognition of their special responsibility for monitoring subsidiarity. It 
would also focus scrutiny on the steps in the lawmaking process in which 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could be and should be most 
transparent - the legislative proposal, the justifi cation of that proposal in 
subsidiarity terms by the Commission, the objections by national parlia-
ments to that proposal on subsidiarity grounds, and the response by the 
Commission to those objections. Whether the Commission maintained or 
amended a draft legislative act in response to a “yellow card”, the above 
suggested procedure would provide a workable and almost certainly ef-
fective mechanism for judicial scrutiny of compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity. It would strike a new and appropriate balance between 
political assessment and judicial control.
Such a synthesis of political and judicial control would require a 
new approach by the Court of Justice
That is not to say that the Court of Justice would actually adopt 
such an approach. But it could. And the present writer would submit 
that it should. European integration does not depend upon an insistent 
stream of European legislation. Europe should legislate only where there 
is a clear case for action and Europe and Europe alone can undertake 
such action effectively. That is the real underlying logic and legitimacy of 
subsidiarity. Europe should act where the option of acting alone is not 
a truly viable option. Such an approach does not undermine the Euro-
pean project, it makes it immeasurably stronger. One reason why such 
efforts have to be made to “sell” Europe to its citizens is that so many of 
its citizens simply cannot see why responsibility for so much legislation is 
taken at European level, rather than at national or regional level. 
For more than forty years the European Court has devised and re-
fi ned legal principles designed to attribute authority to the European in-
stitutions and supremacy to the acts of those institutions. Without that 
judicial effort the European Union would lack effectiveness and credibil-
ity. But the Court’s single greatest weakness to date has been its refusal 
to accept the legitimacy of one of the central constitutional principles of 
40 According to a press release of 30 June 2006, one aim of the Finnish Presidency of July-
December 2006 will be that “greater transparency will be achieved above all through open 
sessions of the Council, which citizens will be able to follow via the Internet….”
17CYELP 2 [2006], pp. 1-17
the Union legal order. The Member States have by incorporating it into 
primary law made subsidiarity part of the normative constitution of the 
Union; yet the Court of Justice gives every appearance of refusing to ac-
cept it as part of the ideological constitution of which the Court sees itself 
as guardian. But times change. And what the European Union needs at 
the present time is to balance centralizing values with the decentralizing 
value of subsidiarity. The present writer would not rule out the possibility 
that the collective commitment to subsidiarity signaled by the introduc-
tion of monitoring by the national parliaments would present the Court 
with a new situation in constitutional terms which would trigger an ap-
propriate judicial response.
Monitoring by national parliaments is achievable even if the 
Constitution Treaty in its present form does not go forward
Although it appears unlikely that the Constitution Treaty will come 
into force, at least in its present form, and under its present name, that 
fact need not necessarily prevent the introduction of subsidiarity moni-
toring by national parliaments. Such monitoring might come into effect as 
a result of a package Treaty changes which fall short of the adoption of a 
Constitution Treaty. Even without Treaty changes, voluntary cooperation 
between the national parliaments and the Community institutions, per-
haps formalized by joint declarations establishing the agreed framework, 
would be suffi cient to put in place machinery close in content and effects 
to that contemplated by the Constitution Treaty Protocol on Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality. The House of Lords EU Committee Report expressed 
the view that “even if the Constitutional Treaty does not enter into force, 
the provisions relating to national parliaments and to subsidiarity can 
and should provide a stimulus to greater and more effective scrutiny by 
all national parliaments in the EU.”41 It is to be hoped that this assess-
ment proves correct. Giving teeth to subsidiarity by entrusting national 
parliaments with responsibility for monitoring its application, and rein-
forcing that responsibility with an appropriate judicial response from the 
Court of Justice, could increase the accountability and legitimacy of Eu-
ropean lawmaking bodies, and could enhance in an unprecedented way 
the sense of “ownership” of the European project at national level.
41 Report (n 10) para 281.
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